

According to Iqbāl, Self possesses freedom of will and is not a rigidly determined reality. Freedom is not a mere hypothesis. As the psychological argument in favour of the freedom of the will states, we intuitively perceive that we are free to choose and act.<sup>1</sup> Iqbāl has pointed out that the operation of thought is essentially not mechanical. The thinking self is free. This is the basic assumption of all knowledge. One thought may lead to, and effect, another thought, but the relation between these two is not that of mechanical necessity. Furthermore, in every act of judgment, there is a judging self, and this self is felt to be free.<sup>2</sup> Freedom is not a postulate which we assume in order to make morality possible, as Kant imagined, but a fact of the human consciousness itself, as our intuitive experience reveals.<sup>3</sup> Iqbāl's viewpoint is reminiscent of Nietzsche who said, "He who feels that his will is not free is insane, he who denies it is foolish."<sup>4</sup>

The associationists, to whom Iqbāl refers, regard the human act of deliberation as "a conflict of motives which are conceived, not as the ego's own present or inherited tendencies of action or inaction, but as so many external forces fighting one another, gladiator-like, on the arena of the mind. Yet the final choice is regarded as a fact determined by the *strongest* forces. . . ."<sup>5</sup> According to Iqbāl, the controversy between the advocates of Mechanism and Freedom arises from a wrong view of intelligent action, namely, that ego-activity is a succession of thoughts and ideas, ultimately resolvable to units of sensations.<sup>6</sup> As the German Configuration Psychology points out, "a careful study of intelligent behaviour discloses the fact of 'insight' over and above the mere succession of sensations. This 'insight' is the ego's appreciation of temporal, spatial, and causal relations of things—the choice, that is to say, of data, in a complex whole, in view of the goal or purpose which the ego has set before itself for the time being."<sup>7</sup> Thus by considerations based on Configuration Psychology, Iqbāl refutes the arguments of those who claim that the determinism of ego and that of Nature are not mutually exclusive, and that the scientific method is equally applicable to human action.<sup>8</sup>

possibility of creators other than God when it describes God as the best of creators (*Sūra* 23:14).<sup>18</sup>

Iqbāl points out that Islam recognises man to be a centre of latent powercapable fo responding to or of rejecting God's guidance. "The truth is from your Lord; wherefore let him who will, believe and let him who will, be incredulous" (*Sūra* 18:19).<sup>19</sup> Man is free to choose between good and evil, and as he chooses so will be requited. "If ye do well, yet will ye do well to your own souls; and if ye do evil, ye will do it unto the same" (*Sūra* 17:7).<sup>20</sup> Iqbāl would have agreed with Dante when he said: "The greatest gift which God in His bounty bestowed in creating and the most conformed to His won goodness, and that which He prizes the most, was the freedom of the will, with which the creatures that have intelligence, they all and they alone, were and are endowed."<sup>21</sup>

The power to act freely is not uniform. Iqbāl points out that Islam takes cognisance of this important fact of human psychology—the rise and fall of the power to exercise the freedom of the will.<sup>22</sup>

Iqbāl says that the Qur'ān upholds the unique individuality of man<sup>23</sup> It is in consequence of this view that Islam rejects the idea of redemption according to which one individual can bear the sins and burdens of others.<sup>24</sup> Iqbāl finds the independent moral responsibility of each human being "expressed clearly in the Qur'ān when it states that each individual 'shall come to Him (the divine judge) on that Day (the day of judgment) singly' (*Sūra* 19:25). 'No soul shall labour but for itself, and no one shall bear another's burden' (*Sūra* 6:164). 'For its own works lieth every soul in pledge' (*Sūra* 74:41).

Like the existentialist philosophers, Iqbāl realizes that freedom carries risk and responsibility. Man is "the trustee of a free personality which he accepted at his peril."<sup>25</sup> Freedom is a condition of goodness but "to permit the emergence of a finite ego who has the power to choose... is really to take a great risk; for the freedom to choose good involves also the freedom to choose what is the opposite of good. That God has taken this risk shows His immense faith in man; it is for man now to justify this faith."<sup>26</sup> Iqbāl points out that according to the Qur'ānic narration, Adam's first transgression was forgiven because his first act of disobedience was also his first act of free choice.<sup>27</sup>

It is the risk involved in freedom of choice which makes it possible to test and develop the potentialities of man. As the Qur'ān says: "And we will prove you with evil, and with good, for a trial of you" (Sūra 21: 33) <sup>28</sup>. "Good and evil," says Iqbāl, "though opposites must fall within the same whole."<sup>29</sup> The consequences of the freedom of will are tragic, for man's acceptance of his selfhood and individuality, in the presence of evil, is an acceptance of man's imperfections which emanate from the "finitude of selfhood."<sup>30</sup>

According to Iqbāl, God took the risk of creating a creature capable of both good and evil, because if man had not the choice of rejecting evil, he could not prove himself to be good. (*Bāl-e-Jibril*, Lahore, 1935).<sup>31</sup> "Goodness is not a matter of compulsion; it is the self's free surrender to the moral ideal... A being whose movements are wholly determined is like a machine which cannot produce goodness."<sup>32</sup>

Iqbāl has referred a number of times in his writings to Sūra 33:72: "We proposed the faith unto the heavens, and the earth, and the mountains: and they refused to undertake the same, and were afraid thereof; but man undertook it: verily he was unjust to himself, and foolish."<sup>33</sup> Even though man has not kept his faith or managed the world worthily having become unjust and senseless, yet he alone had the daring to undertake such a responsibility. In man's freedom lies his responsibility. Whenever Iqbāl speaks of the "trust" man undertook it is in a tone reflecting both pride and humility: (*Zabūr-e-'Ajam*, Lahore, 1927).<sup>34</sup>

Iqbāl is vehemently opposed to the doctrine of *Qismat* and terms it as a degrading type of fatalism.<sup>35</sup> He ascribes the fatalistic element in Islam to the influence of Greek thought. Reaching back through a chain of cause and effect to a first cause in the classical tradition the Muslim philosophers tended to regard the ultimate First Cause as the only cause, and therefore denied the existence of intermediary secondary causes, thus making God the only author of whatever happened. Two other factors added to the growth of fatalism. One was political expediency seeking to justify political atrocities by attributing them to the decrees of God. The second was the diminishing force of the life-impulse of original Islam which produced apathy favourable to a fatalistic outlook.<sup>36</sup>

Leibniz had held that the natural changes of the monad come from an internal principle.<sup>37</sup> Iqbāl conceives of consciousness as unfolding its

“internal infinitude in time like the seed which from the very beginning, carries within it the organic unity of the tree as a present fact.”<sup>38</sup> But although in one sense the future pre-exists in the present, Iqbāl does not believe that life is moving towards a fixed destiny. We have seen that Iqbāl conceives of Creation as the continuous unfolding and fulfilment by God in time of the unlimited possibilities open for His realisation, rather than, as orthodoxy has it, the making of a finished product outstretched in space, confronting God as His “other.”<sup>39</sup> This being so, Iqbāl sees Destiny not as “an unrelenting fate working from without like a taskmaster; it is the inward reach of a thing, its realizable possibilities which lie within the depths of its nature, and serially actualize themselves without any feeling of external compulsion.”<sup>40</sup> The Qur’ānic verse “All things have we created bound by a fixed decree” (Sūra 54-50)<sup>41</sup> would then mean that things are endowed with a fixed potential which it is free to realize or not.

The key to one’s destiny lies in one’s character. “Character,” says Iqbāl, “is the ultimate equipment of man, since it is from character that all actions flow...”<sup>42</sup>

By doing nothing and just waiting expectantly for the manna to fall from heaven, one cannot hope to achieve the destiny which man strives, “for man is man and master of his fate.”<sup>43</sup> (*Zabūr-e ‘Ajam*).<sup>44</sup>

It is upto man to make himself a helpless prisoner of Fate or to rise up and carve his destiny. Should he make the effort, Iqbāl believes, the way will open before his advancing steps. (*Payām-e Mashriq*, Lahore, 1923).<sup>45</sup>

If man does not find his environment congenial to himself, there is no reason why he should not—in the words of ‘Umar Khayyām—“shatter it to bits, and remould it nearer to the heart’s desire.” (*Jāvid Nāma*, Lahore, 1932).<sup>46</sup>

In Iqbāl’s eyes, the creation of something new, even if it is sinful, is an accomplishment: (*Payām-e Mashriq*).<sup>47</sup>

The sinner he depicts is proud of his deed and does not wish to be relieved of its responsibility: (*Zabūr-e ‘Ajam*).<sup>48</sup>

If a man or a nation does not strive, then it is not worthy of a glorious future. To such a man or such a nation Iqbāl extends neither hope nor sympathy. (*Ḍarb-e-Kalim*, Lahore, 1936).<sup>49</sup>

Iqbāl constantly refers to the Qur'ānic verse, "Verily God will not change the condition of men, till they change what is in themselves" (Sūra 13:12).<sup>50</sup> If Man "does not take the initiative, if he does not evolve the inner richness of his being, if he ceases to feel the inward push of advancing life, then the spirit within him hardens into stone and he is reduced to the level of dead matter."<sup>51</sup> But if he does transform himself, God will ask him to choose his own destiny.<sup>52</sup>

Or man can petition God for a new destiny if he be not satisfied with his present one: (*Jāvid Nāma*).<sup>53</sup>

In "Jawāb-e-Shikwa" God promises that if Man be indeed faithful, then his destiny is whatever he desires it to be: (*Bāng-e Darā*, Lahore, 1924, p. 232.).<sup>54</sup>

One important question arises from Iqbāl's view of freedom of the will and destiny: how is man's freedom of choice compatible with the idea of submission to God's will which plays such an important part in Islamic belief? For Iqbāl, to submit to the will of God, to say "They Will be done," is not to contradict or curtail our own freedom, it is our own action and full expression, of our true selves in freedom. In a poem entitled "Taslim-o Razā," he explains the meaning of submission: (*Ḍarb-e Kalīm*, p. 22).<sup>55</sup>

Resignation to God's will, *tawakkul*, is not mere acceptance of that which is inevitable. *Tawakkul* is born not out of an awareness of one's helplessness, but is the result of *īmān*, the vital way of making the world our own.<sup>56</sup> "*īmān*", says Iqbāl, "is not merely a passive belief in one or more propositions of a certain kind; it is a living assurance begotten of a rare experience."<sup>57</sup> This experience became embodied in classic utterances, such as "I am the creative Truth" (Ḥallāj), "I am destiny" (Mu'āwiya; and "I am the speaking Qur'ān" ('Alī).<sup>58</sup> Only "strong personalities are capable of rising to this experience and the 'higher fatalism' implied in it."<sup>59</sup> This 'higher fatalism' does not look upon the affairs of the world as a fortuitous concomitance of atoms, but recognises the all-embracing activity of the wise and loving Creator.<sup>60</sup> In a remarkable passage in *Jāvid Nāma*, Ḥallāj explains the true meaning and significance of predestination:<sup>61</sup>

The higher fatalism is described by Tennyson:

"Our wills are ours, we know not how

Our wills are ours to make them Thine.”<sup>62</sup>

“...which the great religious heroes of all times and religions have described as the highest and most paradoxical experience”<sup>63</sup> is, for Iqbāl, generative of “life and boundless power which recognises no obstruction, and can make a man calmly offer his prayers when bullets are showering around him.”<sup>64</sup> The man of God whose will is perfectly attuned to the Will of God, becomes the maker of history and destiny: (*Bāng-e Darā*).<sup>65</sup>

With his hand he can work miracles,<sup>66</sup> for Iqbāl believes that “man is really free only in God, the source of his freedom,”<sup>67</sup> and can see the source of divine law within the depths of his being, he is troubled by doubt.

(*Pas Chih Bāyad Kard Ai Aqwām-e Sharq?* Lahore, 1936).<sup>68</sup>

But having grasped the “vital way” of life, he acquires unlimited power.<sup>69</sup>

One writer has contended that Iqbāl, despite his insistence on human freedom, is a believer in determinism, since he has admitted on several occasions that when there is a conflict between *taqdir* (Divine decree) and *tadbir* (human design), the latter is unable to do any thing.<sup>70</sup>

This does not contradict or repudiate Iqbāl’s belief in human freedom. This merely indicates that Iqbāl recognises an over-ruling Power which disposes while Man proposes. Iqbāl has nowhere asserted that Man is completely free. Only God—the most Perfect Individual—possesses perfect freedom. But this does not mean that Man is completely determined. His will is limited only by the Will of God:<sup>71</sup> and the more perfect his Selfhood becomes, the more willingly he surrenders his will to the Will of God.

In his letter to Professor Nicholson, Iqbāl points out that life is an endeavour for freedom.<sup>72</sup> This view is based on the *Hadith*: “Faith lies between Necessity and Freedom.” Man is subject to God’s will but since “God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to Man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature.”<sup>73</sup>

Like Rūmī, Iqbāl does not consider the freedom of choice as an end in itself; the end of freedom is that man may decide freely to live according to his higher self. The end of freedom is self-determination at a higher plane. At the end freedom and determination (which is not the same as

coercion or constraint) become one. Kant had held that the source of the moral law is in the innermost self of man, and that man's autonomy consists in imposing this law upon himself. For Iqbāl's viewpoint also "the individual achieves a free personality, not by releasing himself from the fetters of the law, but by discovering the ultimate source of the law within the depths of his own consciousness."<sup>74</sup>

"It has been argued", says Professor Nicholson, "that Sūfism reaches its logical conclusion in the state of *fanā*... when the self 'passes away' from itself."<sup>74</sup> This idea is completely unacceptable to Iqbāl. According to him the ideal of perfect manhood in Islam is that full-grown ego which can retain its self-possession even in the case of a direct contact with the all-embracing Ego.<sup>76</sup> He refers<sup>77</sup> to the Prophet's vision of the Ultimate Ego, quoting the Qur'ānic verse: "His eyesight turned not aside, neither did it wander" (Sūra 53:17)<sup>78</sup>

Like Tillich, Iqbāl believes that "the centre of a completely individualized being cannot be entered by any other individualized being, and it cannot be made into a mere part of higher unity."<sup>79</sup> In "Gulshan-e Rāz-e Jadīd," Iqbāl says: Rather than losing oneself in God as a drop loses itself in the ocean, "the true person...absorbs God into his ego."<sup>80</sup> "The normal and religious ideal of man," says Iqbāl, "is not self-negation but self-affirmation, and he attains to this ideal by becoming more and more individual, more and more unique. The Prophet said, 'Create in yourselves the attributes of Allah;' and thus man becomes unique by becoming more and more like the most unique Individual"<sup>81</sup>

Iqbāl points out that Islam does not "contemplate complete liberation from finitude as the highest state of human bliss." He sees no contradiction between realising the Infinite and retaining one's individuality.<sup>82</sup> "True infinity," he says, "does not mean infinite extension which cannot be achieved without embracing all available finite extension. Its nature consists in intensity, and not extensity. And the moment we fix our gaze upon intensity, we begin to see that the finite ego must be distinct though not isolated from the Infinite."<sup>83</sup>

Iqbāl's Ideal Man is not willing to part with his Selfhood either for immortality or for a vision of God.<sup>84</sup>

He points out that "the '*fanā*' in the Islamic mysticism means not extension but complete surrender of the human ego to the Divine Ego.

The ideal of Islamic mysticism is a stage beyond the stage of *fanā* i.e. *baqā* which from my point of view is the highest stage of self-affirmation.”<sup>85</sup>

Following the tradition “Heaven and earth do not contain Me, but the heart of my faithful servant contains Me.”<sup>86</sup> Iqbāl describes unitive experience not as “the finite ego effacing its own identity by some sort of absorption into the Infinite Ego,” but rather as “the Infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite.”<sup>87</sup> For Iqbāl “the end of the ego’s quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality; it is, on the other hand, a more precise definition of it.”<sup>88</sup> Man can discover God only by retaining his Selfhood not by resigning it, as the great lover of God, Ḥallāj says:

You who seek your goal in annihilation.  
Non-existence can never discover existence. <sup>89</sup>

## NOTES

1. Haq, I., “Freedom of Will and Determinism”, *Al-Ḥikmat*, Lahore, 1967, p. 83.
2. Enver, I. H. *Metaphysics of Iqbal* (Lahore: Ashraf, 1944), pp. 48-49.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
4. Nietzsche, F, quoted in *The Encyclopaedia of Religious Quotations*. Edited by Mead, F.S., (London 1965), p. 104.
5. Muahmmad Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Muḥammad Ashraf, reprint 1962), p. 107.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. Siddiqi, R., “Iqbal and Free Will”, *The Pakistan Quarterly*, August, 1954, Volume IV, No. 3, pp. 20-21.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 50.
12. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 108.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 79-80.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Bausani, A. “Iqbal: His Philosophy of Religion and the West,” in *Crescent and Green* (London, 1955), p. 54.
18. Quoted by Nicholson, R.A. in his Introduction to *The Secrets of the Self* (London: MacMillan, 1920) p. XVIII.
19. Sale, G., *The Koran* (London: F. Warne, 1890), p. 220.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
21. Dante, A., quoted in *The Encyclopaedia of Religious Quotations*, p. 151.
22. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 109.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 95.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Sale, G., (translation of) *The Koran*, p. 244.
29. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 85.
30. *ibid*
31. Godhead lies in creating Selfhood.
32. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 85.
33. Sale, G., (translation of) *The Koran*, p. 321.
34. What can I say, what can I say  
 About the "I" its splendour and its might?  
 It was the "I" that answered the Creator's call  
 To take up His vicegerency,  
 Which caused the heavens to quail  
 And draw back in sheer fright.  
 The heavens still tremble at its majesty.  
 It holds in its embrace  
 Both Time and Space:  
 It has selected man's heart for its dwelling-place  
 A hut of mud to house a King.  
 (Translation by Husain, H., *The New Rose-Garden of Mystery*, p. 12).
35. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 110.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 110-111.
37. Leibniz, G.W., *Philosophical Writings*, translated by Morris, M. (London 1965), p. 6.
38. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 6.
39. Whittemore, R. "Iqbal's Pantheism;" in the *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), April 21, 1961, Iqbal Day Supplement, pp. III, V.
40. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 50.
41. Sale, G., (translation of) *The Koran*, p. 393.
42. Strange, strange the fates that govern  
 This world of stress and strain,  
 But in the fires of action  
 Fate's mysteries are made plain.  
 The prayers of God's fold treading  
 The battlefield's red sod,  
 Forged in the flame of action

- Become the voice of God.  
(Translation by Kiernan, V.G., *Poems from Iqbāl*, Bombay, 1947, p. 55).
43. Tennyson, A., quoted in *The Encyclopaedia of Religious Quotations*, p. 143.
44. Although the soul, I know,  
One day unveiled shall be,  
Think not it shall be so  
By writing endlessly.  
It needs a blow, to stir  
The sleeping soul from earth;  
Unswep, the harp can ne'er  
Bring Melody to brith.  
Transcend the dust, nor take  
Theyself but dust to be;  
If thou thy breast will break,  
The moon shall shine from thee.  
(Translation by Arberry, A.J., *Persian Psalms*, Lahore, Ashraf, 1948, p. 89).
45. Set not the chain of Fate upon thy foot;  
There is a Way beyond this rolling sphere;  
If thou believest not, rise up, and find  
Thy foot uplifted leapeth in the air.  
(Translation by Arberry A.J., *The Tulip of Sinai*, London, 1947, p. 16).
46. Are you alive? Be vehement, be creative;  
Like Us, embrace all horizons;  
Break whatsoever is uncongenial,  
Out of your heart's heart produce a new world-  
It is irksome to the free servitor  
To live in a world belonging to others.  
Whoever possesses not the power to create  
In Our sight is naught but an infidel, a heathen;  
Such a one has not taken his share of Our Beauty,  
Has not tasted the fruit of the Tree of Life.  
Man of God, be trenchant as a sword,  
Be yourself your own world's destiny.  
(Translation by Arberry, A.J., *Jāvid Nāma*, p. 138).
47. If by thy labour something rare is wrought,  
Though it be sin, it hath its own reward.  
(Translation by Arberry, A.J., *The Tulip of Sinai*, p. 21).
48. A sinner proud am I; no need  
I take, except I work for it;  
I rage, because men say He writ  
Predestinate my wilful deed.  
(Translation by Araberry, A.J., *Persian Psalms*, p. 92).
49. That nation does not deserve the renaissance of Tomorrow which has not in its des-  
tiny Today.

50. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 12.
51. *Ibid.*
52. Elevate your Selfhood so that before each Judgment  
God Himself should ask of Man "What is it you wish?" (*Ḍarb-e Kalīm*)
53. If your heart bleeds on account of one destiny,  
Petition God to decree another destiny;  
If you pray for a new destiny, that is lawful  
Seeing that God's destinies are infinite.  
Earthlings have gambled away the coin of selfhood,  
Not comprehending the subtle meaning of destiny;  
Its subtlety is contained in a single phrase-  
'If you transform yourself, it too will be transformed.'  
Be dust, and fate will give you the winds;  
Be stone, and it will hurl you against glase.  
Are you a dew-drop? your destiny is to perish;  
Are you an ocean? your destiny is to endure.  
(Translation by Arberry, A.J., *Jāvid Nāma*, p. 85).
54. This world is nothing, the Tablet and Pen are yours.
55. In every branch this subtle truth is manifest  
That even plants desire the wide space.  
The seed is not content to remain in the dark soil,  
It longs to shoot up and grow to full bloom.  
Do not suppress the functions of your nature -  
This is not what is meant by submission.  
If you have the courage to advance, then space is unbounded,  
O man of God, God's earth is not so narrow.
56. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 109.
57. *Ibid.*
58. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.
60. Arnold, T.W. *The Islamic Faith* (London, 1928.), p. 24.
61. Whoever possesses the apparatus of destiny,  
Iblis and death tremble before his might.  
Predestination is the religion of man of zeal.  
Predestination for heroes is the perfection of power.  
Ripe souls become yet riper through constraint  
Which for raw man is the embrace of the tomb.  
The business of true men is resignation and submission;  
This garment does not suit the weaklings.  
You who say, "This was to be, and not happened,  
All things were tethered to a divine decree, and so happened  
You have little understood the meaning of destiny;  
You have seen neither selfhood nor God:  
The believer true thus petitions God:  
'We accord with you, so accord with us.'

- His resolution is the creator of God's determination  
 And on the day of battle his arrow is God's arrow.  
 (Translation by Arberry, A.J., *Jāvid Nāma*, pp. 94-95).
62. Tennyson, A. "In Memoriam A.H.H", *The Poetical Works*, (London, 1959) p. 239.
63. Schimmel, A.M., *Gabriel's Wing*, p. 302.
64. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 110.
65. In servitude, both swords and schemes are useless,  
 When faith is born, the chains are broken loose.  
 Who can imagine what the strength of his arm would be?  
 The gaze of a man of God can alter fate.
66. The hand of a faithful is the Hand of God. (*Bāle Jibrīl*)
67. Eddy, S., quoted in *The Encyclopaedia of Religious Quotations*, p. 151.
68. As long as man does not behold God,  
 He does not emerge from predestination and free-choice.
69. When he loses himself in the satisfaction of God  
 The faithful becomes God's instrument of destiny.
70. Rahmān, M.W. "Iqbal's Doctrine of Destiny", *The Islamic Culture*, XIII, 1939,  
 pp. 159-160.  
 None but God is the creator of destiny  
 And against destiny human design is powerless.  
 (Translation by Arberry, A.J., *Jāvid Nāma*, p. 85).
71. Plants and animals are bound by the decree of Fate,  
 But the Man of God is only subject to the Laws of God. (*Ḍarb-e-Kalim*)
72. Iqbal quoted by Nicholson, R.A., in the Introduction to *The Secrets of the Self*,  
 pp. XX-XXI.
73. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 147.  
 For it (the self) has been allotted the supreme  
 Control of the realm of existence so  
 That it may manifest itself infinitely.  
 Its destiny is immanent  
 In its own nature and, though outwardly  
 Dependent on pure accident,  
 It is completely free.  
 What more can I tell you about  
 What it is like, what not?  
 The Holy Prophet said that Faith  
 Resides between Necessity and Freedom. You  
 Think all created things are subject to  
 A foreordained Necessity.  
 But the Soul is God's own breath,  
 Enshrined, for all its self-display,  
 In its inviolable retreat,  
 From Nature's hurly-burly far away.  
 There is no question of Necessity -

- Ordaining it;  
 For Soul cannot be Soul, unless completely free.  
 Created by Necessity, it hurled  
 Itself at this material world  
 And, conquering it, gained  
 A freedom unrestrained. (*Zabūr-e-'Ajām*)  
 (Translation by Husain H., *The New Rose-Garden of Mystery*, p. 13.
74. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 181.  
 75. Nicholson, R.A., *The Idea of Personality in Sufism*, (Cambridge 1923), pp. 14-18.  
 76. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 118.  
 77. *Ibid.*  
 78. Sale, G. (translation of) *The Koran*, p. 390.  
 79. Tillich, P. *Love, Power, and Justice* (London, 1959), p. 26.  
 80. To be lost in His sea is not our destiny;  
 And if you span it, you can never cease to be.  
 That Self should be submerged in Self is an impossibility:  
 To be the essence of Selfhood is the Self's apogee  
 (Translation by Husain, H., *The New Rose-Garden of Mystery*, p. 10).
81. Iqbāl, quoted by Nicholson, R.A., in Introduction to *The Secrets of the Self*, pp. xviii- xix.  
 82. Naravane, V.S. *Modern Indian Thought* (London, 1964), p. 290.  
 83. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 118.  
 84. If but atom must I give  
 Of this fabric that I live,  
 Too great a price were that, for me  
 To purchase immortality.  
 (Translation by Arberry, A.J. *Persian Psalms*, p. 45).  
 If vision self-effacement bring,  
 The veil is a far better thing;  
 Thy trade hath little to entice  
 That doth require so great a price.  
 (Translation by Arberry, A.J., *Persian Psalms*, p. 35).
85. *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, p. 244.  
 86. Schimmel, A.M. *Gabriel's Wing*, p. 121.  
 87. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 110.  
 88. *Ibid.*, p. 198.  
 89. Translation by Arberry, A.J., *Jāvid Nāma*, p. 101.

“Freedom of Will and Man's Destiny in Iqbal's Thought,” in *Islamic Studies*, Islamabad, Pakistan, Volume XVII, No. 4, Winter 1978, pp. 207-220.